Aquinas Summa Theologiae I Q 84 Art 5 Intellectual Light
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Summa Theologica, by St. Thomas Aquinas, [1947], at sacred-texts.com
OF PROPHECY (Half-dozen ARTICLES)
Afterwards treating individually of all the virtues and vices that pertain to men of all conditions and estates, we must now consider those things which pertain especially to certain men. Now in that location is a triple deviation betwixt men equally regards things connected with the soul's habits and acts. First, in reference to the various free graces, according to 1 Cor. 12:4, 7: "There are diversities of graces . . . and to ane . . . by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge," etc. Another departure arises from the diversities of life, namely the active and the wistful life, which correspond to diverse purposes of performance, wherefore it is stated (1 Cor. 12:4, 7) that "at that place are diversities of operations." For the purpose of operation in Martha, who "was busy about much serving," which pertains to the agile life, differed from the purpose of operation in Mary, "who sitting . . . at the Lord's feet, heard His word" (Luke x:39, 40), which pertains to the contemplative life. A third difference corresponds to the various duties and states of life, as expressed in Eph. four:11, "And He gave some apostles; and some prophets; and other some evangelists; and other some pastors and doctors": and this pertains to diversity of ministries, of which it is written (i Cor. 12:v): "There are diversities of ministries."
With regard to gratuitous graces, which are the first object to be considered, it must be observed that some of them pertain to knowledge, some to speech, and some to operation. At present all things pertaining to knowledge may exist comprised under "prophecy," since prophetic revelation extends not but to future events relating to man, but also to things relating to God, both as to those which are to be believed past all and are matters of "faith," and as to yet higher mysteries, which business concern the perfect and belong to "wisdom." Again, prophetic revelation is nearly things pertaining to spiritual substances, past whom we are urged to good or evil; this pertains to the "discernment of spirits." Moreover it extends to the direction of human acts, and this pertains to "knowledge," as nosotros shall explicate farther on (Q[177]). Appropriately nosotros must first of all consider prophecy, and rapture which is a degree of prophecy.
Prophecy admits of four heads of consideration: (1) its essence; (2) its cause; (3) the way of prophetic knowledge; (4) the division of prophecy.
Under the first head at that place are six points of inquiry:
(one) Whether prophecy pertains to knowledge?
(2) Whether information technology is a habit?
(3) Whether information technology is only near time to come contingencies?
(4) Whether a prophet knows all possible matters of prophecy?
(5) Whether a prophet distinguishes that which he perceives past the souvenir of God, from that which he perceives past his ain spirit?
(6) Whether annihilation simulated can exist the matter of prophecy?
Whether prophecy pertains to knowledge?
Objection 1: It would seem that prophecy does not pertain to cognition. For it is written (Ecclus. 48:xiv) that afterwards death the body of Eliseus prophesied, and further on (Ecclus. 49:18) information technology is said of Joseph that "his bones were visited, and after decease they prophesied." Now no knowledge remains in the body or in the basic afterward death. Therefore prophecy does non pertain to cognition.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (1 Cor. 14:3): "He that prophesieth, speaketh to men unto betterment." Now voice communication is not knowledge itself, but its effect. Therefore it would seem that prophecy does not pertain to knowledge.
Objection iii: Farther, every cognitive perfection excludes folly and madness. All the same both of these are consequent with prophecy; for information technology is written (Osee 9:seven): "Know ye, O State of israel, that the prophet was foolish and mad [*Vulg.: 'the spiritual human was mad']." Therefore prophecy is not a cerebral perfection.
Objection 4: Further, just as revelation regards the intellect, so inspiration regards, apparently, the affections, since information technology denotes a kind of movement. Now prophecy is described as "inspiration" or "revelation," according to Cassiodorus [*Prolog. super Psalt. i]. Therefore information technology would seem that prophecy does not pertain to the intellect more than to the angel.
On the reverse, It is written (i Kings ix:9): "For he that is now called a prophet, in fourth dimension past was called a seer." Now sight pertains to cognition. Therefore prophecy pertains to noesis.
I answer that, Prophecy commencement and chiefly consists in knowledge, because, to wit, prophets know things that are far [procul] removed from man's noesis. Wherefore they may be said to take their proper name from , "apparition," because things appear to them from afar. Wherefore, as Isidore states (Etym. vii, 8), "in the Sometime Attestation, they were called Seers, because they saw what others saw not, and surveyed things hidden in mystery." Hence among infidel nations they were known as "vates, on account of their power of mind [vi mentis]," [*The Latin 'vates' is from the Greek , and may be rendered 'soothsayer'] (Etym. viii, 7).
Since, however, it is written (1 Cor. 12:7): "The manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit," and further on (i Cor. 14:12): "Seek to grow unto the betterment of the Church," information technology follows that prophecy consists secondarily in speech, in so far equally the prophets declare for the instruction of others, the things they know through existence taught of God, according to the saying of Is. 21:x, "That which I have heard of the Lord of hosts, the God of Israel, I have declared unto yous." Accordingly, equally Isidore says (Etym. 8, 7), "prophets" may exist described every bit "proefatores [foretellers], because they tell from afar [porro fantur]," that is, speak from a distance, "and foretell the truth about things to come."
At present those things to a higher place human ken which are revealed by God cannot exist confirmed by human reason, which they surpass equally regards the operation of the Divine ability, according to Mk. xvi:20, "They . . . preached everywhere, the Lord working withal and confirming the word with signs that followed." Hence, thirdly, prophecy is concerned with the working of miracles, every bit a kind of confirmation of the prophetic utterances. Wherefore it is written (Deut. 34:10, eleven): "There arose no more than a prophet in Israel similar unto Moses, whom the Lord knew face to face, in all the signs and wonders."
Reply to Objection 1: These passages speak of prophecy in reference to the third signal just mentioned, which regards the proof of prophecy.
Reply to Objection 2: The Campaigner is speaking in that location of the prophetic utterances.
Reply to Objection 3: Those prophets who are described equally foolish and mad are non true only false prophets, of whom it is said (Jer. 3:16): "Hearken not to the words of the prophets that prophesy to you, and deceive you; they speak a vision of their own heart, and not out of the mouth of the Lord," and (Ezech. 13:3): "Woe to the foolish prophets, that follow their own spirit, and see nothing."
Reply to Objection 4: It is requisite to prophecy that the intention of the mind exist raised to the perception of Divine things: wherefore it is written (Ezech. 2:1): "Son of man, stand up upon thy feet, and I will speak to thee." This raising of the intention is brought well-nigh by the motion of the Holy Ghost, wherefore the text goes on to say: "And the Spirit entered into me . . . and He gear up me upon my feet." After the mind's intention has been raised to heavenly things, it perceives the things of God; hence the text continues: "And I heard Him speaking to me." Appropriately inspiration is requisite for prophecy, as regards the raising of the mind, co-ordinate to Job 32:8, "The inspiration of the Almighty giveth agreement": while revelation is necessary, as regards the very perception of Divine things, whereby prophecy is completed; by its ways the veil of darkness and ignorance is removed, according to Task 12:22, "He discovereth great things out of darkness."
Whether prophecy is a habit?
Objection 1: It would seem that prophecy is a habit. For according to Ethic. ii, 5, "there are iii things in the soul, power, passion, and habit." Now prophecy is not a power, for so it would exist in all men, since the powers of the soul are mutual to them. Once again it is not a passion, since the passions vest to the appetitive faculty, as stated above (FS, Q[22] , A[2]); whereas prophecy pertains principally to knowledge, as stated in the foregoing Article. Therefore prophecy is a habit.
Objection 2: Farther, every perfection of the soul, which is not ever in human activity, is a habit. Now prophecy is a perfection of the soul; and it is non always in act, else a prophet could not exist described as asleep. Therefore seemingly prophecy is a habit.
Objection 3: Further, prophecy is reckoned among the gratuitous graces. Now grace is something in the soul, after the manner of a habit, as stated above (FS, Q[110], A[ii]). Therefore prophecy is a habit.
On the reverse, A habit is something "whereby we act when we will," every bit the Commentator [*Averroes or Ibn Roshd, 1120-1198] says (De Anima iii). Only a man cannot make utilise of prophecy when he will, as appears in the case of Eliseus (four Kings 3:15), "who on Josaphat inquiring of him apropos the future, and the spirit of prophecy failing him, acquired a minstrel to exist brought to him, that the spirit of prophecy might come downwards upon him through the praise of psalmody, and fill his mind with things to come up," as Gregory observes (Hom. i super Ezech.). Therefore prophecy is not a habit.
I answer that, As the Campaigner says (Eph. 5:thirteen), "all that is fabricated manifest is light," because, to wit, just every bit the manifestation of the material sight takes place through textile light, and so too the manifestation of intellectual sight takes identify through intellectual light. Accordingly manifestation must exist proportionate to the calorie-free by means of which it takes place, even as an effect is proportionate to its cause. Since then prophecy pertains to a knowledge that surpasses natural reason, as stated in a higher place (A[1]), information technology follows that prophecy requires an intellectual light surpassing the light of natural reason. Hence the maxim of Micah 7:8: "When I sit down in darkness, the Lord is my calorie-free." At present low-cal may be in a field of study in two ways: first, past manner of an abiding course, as textile light is in the sun, and in fire; secondly, by style of a passion, or passing impression, as light is in the air. Now the prophetic light is non in the prophet's intellect by manner of an abiding form, else a prophet would e'er be able to prophesy, which is conspicuously imitation. For Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.): "Sometimes the spirit of prophecy is lacking to the prophet, nor is it always inside the call of his mind, yet so that in its absence he knows that its presence is due to a gift." Hence Eliseus said of the Sunamite adult female (4 Kings 4:27): "Her soul is in anguish, and the Lord hath hid it from me, and hath not told me." The reason for this is that the intellectual lite that is in a subject past fashion of an abiding and complete class, perfects the intellect chiefly to the event of knowing the principle of the things manifested by that calorie-free; thus by the light of the active intellect the intellect knows chiefly the showtime principles of all things known naturally. Now the principle of things pertaining to supernatural cognition, which are manifested past prophecy, is God Himself, Whom the prophets exercise not see in His essence, although He is seen by the blessed in heaven, in whom this light is by manner of an abiding and complete form, according to Ps. 35:ten, "In Thy light nosotros shall meet calorie-free."
It follows therefore that the prophetic light is in the prophet's soul by style of a passion or transitory impression. This is indicated Ex. 33:22: "When my celebrity shall pass, I volition ready thee in a hole of the stone," etc., and three Kings xix:11: "Go along and stand upon the mountain before the Lord; and behold the Lord passeth," etc. Hence it is that fifty-fifty as the air is ever in need of a fresh enlightening, and so likewise the prophet'due south mind is e'er in need of a fresh revelation; thus a disciple who has non yet caused the principles of an art needs to have every item explained to him. Wherefore it is written (Is. ane:4): "In the morn He wakeneth my ear, so that I may hear Him every bit a master." This is also indicated by the very manner in which prophecies are uttered: thus it is stated that "the Lord spake to such and such a prophet," or that "the word of the Lord," or "the hand of the Lord was made upon him."
Merely a habit is an abiding form. Wherefore it is evident that, properly speaking, prophecy is non a addiction.
Answer to Objection 1: This division of the Philosopher's does non incorporate absolutely all that is in the soul, but merely such as tin be principles of moral actions, which are washed sometimes from passion, sometimes from habit, sometimes from mere power, as in the instance of those who perform an activeness from the judgment of their reason before having the habit of that action.
Even so, prophecy may exist reduced to a passion, provided nosotros understand passion to announce any kind of receiving, in which sense the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that "to understand is, in a style, to be passive." For merely equally, in natural cognition, the possible intellect is passive to the light of the active intellect, so too in prophetic knowledge the human intellect is passive to the enlightening of the Divine calorie-free.
Reply to Objection two: But as in corporeal things, when a passion ceases, there remains a sure bent to a repetition of the passion---thus wood one time ignited is more easily ignited again, so too in the prophet's intellect, after the actual enlightenment has ceased, in that location remains an aptitude to be enlightened anew---thus when the mind has once been aroused to devotion, it is more easily recalled to its former devotion. Hence Augustine says (De orando Deum. Ep. cxxx, 9) that our prayers demand to exist frequent, "lest devotion exist extinguished as shortly equally information technology is kindled."
We might, however, answer that a person is called a prophet, even while his prophetic enlightenment ceases to be actual, on account of his being deputed by God, according to Jer. 1:5, "And I made thee a prophet unto the nations."
Answer to Objection 3: Every gift of grace raises human to something to a higher place homo nature, and this may happen in two ways. First, every bit to the substance of the act---for instance, the working of miracles, and the noesis of the uncertain and hidden things of Divine wisdom---and for such acts human being is not granted a habitual gift of grace. Secondly, a thing is in a higher place human nature every bit to the mode simply not the substance of the human activity---for instance to love God and to know Him in the mirror of His creatures---and for this a habitual gift of grace is bestowed.
Whether prophecy is only about future contingencies?
Objection one: It would seem that prophecy is only about future contingencies. For Cassiodorus says [*Prol. super Psalt. i] that "prophecy is a Divine inspiration or revelation, announcing the issue of things with unchangeable truth." Now issues pertain to future contingencies. Therefore the prophetic revelation is virtually future contingencies lonely.
Objection two: Further, according to 1 Cor. 12, the grace of prophecy is differentiated from wisdom and organized religion, which are about Divine things; and from the discernment of spirits, which is nearly created spirits; and from knowledge, which is most human things. Now habits and acts are differentiated by their objects, as stated in a higher place (FS, Q[54], A[ii]). Therefore it seems that the object of prophecy is not continued with any of the above. Therefore it follows that it is nigh future contingencies lone.
Objection 3: Further, departure of object causes deviation of species, as stated above (FS, Q[54], A[two]). Therefore, if one prophecy is about futurity contingencies, and another virtually other things, it would seem to follow that these are different species of prophecy.
On the opposite, Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.) that some prophecies are "about the time to come, for instance (Is. 7:14), 'Behold a virgin shall conceive, and bear a son'"; some are "most the past, as (Gn. 1:1), 'In the commencement God created heaven and globe'"; some are "near the present," as (1 Cor. 14:24, 25), "If all prophesy, and there come in one that believeth non . . . the secrets of his heart are made manifest." Therefore prophecy is non almost future contingencies alone.
I reply that, A manifestation made by means of a certain light can extend to all those things that are bailiwick to that light: thus the body'southward sight extends to all colors, and the soul's natural knowledge extends to whatever is subject field to the light of the active intellect. At present prophetic knowledge comes through a Divine calorie-free, whereby it is possible to know all things both Divine and human, both spiritual and corporeal; and consequently the prophetic revelation extends to them all. Thus by the ministry of spirits a prophetic revelation concerning the perfections of God and the angels was made to Is. 6:ane, where it is written, "I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne loftier and elevated." Moreover his prophecy contains matters referring to natural bodies, according to the words of Is. 40:12, "Who hath measured the waters in the hollow of His hand," etc. It also contains matters relating to human being bear, according to Is. 58:1, "Deal thy bread to the hungry," etc.; and besides this it contains things pertaining to futurity events, according to Is. 47:9, "Two things shall come upon thee suddenly in i twenty-four hour period, barrenness and widowhood."
Since, however, prophecy is about things remote from our knowledge, it must be observed that the more than remote things are from our knowledge the more pertinent they are to prophecy. Of such things there are three degrees. One degree comprises things remote from the knowledge, either sensitive or intellective, of some detail man, but not from the knowledge of all men; thus a particular human knows past sense things present to him locally, which another man does not know by human being sense, since they are removed from him. Thus Eliseus knew prophetically what his disciple Giezi had washed in his absence (4 Kings 5:26), and in like manner the secret thoughts of i human being are manifested prophetically to another, according to one Cor. fourteen:25; and once more in this way what one man knows by demonstration may be revealed to another prophetically.
The second degree comprises those things which surpass the knowledge of all men without exception, not that they are in themselves unknowable, but on business relationship of a defect in human knowledge; such equally the mystery of the Trinity, which was revealed past the Seraphim maxim: "Holy, Holy, Holy," etc. (Is. 6:3).
The last degree comprises things remote from the cognition of all men, through being in themselves unknowable; such are hereafter contingencies, the truth of which is indeterminate. And since that which is predicated universally and by its very nature, takes precedence of that which is predicated in a express and relative sense, it follows that revelation of future events belongs most properly to prophecy, and from this prophecy plainly takes its name. Hence Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.): "And since a prophet is so called because he foretells the future, his name loses its significance when he speaks of the past or present."
Reply to Objection 1: Prophecy is at that place defined according to its proper signification; and it is in this sense that it is differentiated from the other gratuitous graces.
Respond to Objection ii: This is evident from what has just been said. We might as well reply that all those things that are the matter of prophecy have the common aspect of beingness unknowable to man except past Divine revelation; whereas those that are the matter of "wisdom," "knowledge," and the "interpretation of speeches," can be known by man through natural reason, merely are manifested in a higher mode through the enlightening of the Divine light. Equally to "faith," although it is about things invisible to man, it is not concerned with the knowledge of the things believed, but with a man'southward finality of assent to things known past others.
Respond to Objection iii: The formal element in prophetic knowledge is the Divine lite, which existence one, gives unity of species to prophecy, although the things prophetically manifested by the Divine light are diverse.
Whether by the Divine revelation a prophet knows all that can be known prophetically?
Objection 1: It would seem that by the Divine revelation a prophet knows all that tin be known prophetically. For information technology is written (Amos iii:7): "The Lord God doth zilch without revealing His secret to His servants the prophets." Now whatever is revealed prophetically is something washed by God. Therefore in that location is not one of them merely what is revealed to the prophet.
Objection ii: Further, "God's works are perfect" (Dt. 32:4). At present prophecy is a "Divine revelation," equally stated in a higher place (A[3]). Therefore it is perfect; and this would not be so unless all possible matters of prophecy were revealed prophetically, since "the perfect is that which lacks cypher" (Phys. iii, 6). Therefore all possible matters of prophecy are revealed to the prophet.
Objection 3: Farther, the Divine light which causes prophecy is more powerful than the right of natural reason which is the cause of human science. Now a man who has acquired a science knows whatever pertains to that science; thus a grammarian knows all matters of grammar. Therefore it would seem that a prophet knows all matters of prophecy.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.) that "sometimes the spirit of prophecy indicates the present to the prophet's listen and nowise the futurity; and sometimes it points not to the nowadays only to the future." Therefore the prophet does non know all matters of prophecy.
I respond that, Things which differ from one another need not exist simultaneously, save by reason of some ane matter in which they are connected and on which they depend: thus it has been stated to a higher place (FS, Q[65], AA[1],2) that all the virtues must needs be simultaneously on account of prudence and charity. Now all the things that are known through some principle are connected in that principle and depend thereon. Hence he who knows a principle perfectly, as regards all to which its virtue extends, knows at the aforementioned fourth dimension all that tin can be known through that principle; whereas if the common principle is unknown, or known merely in a general fashion, it does not follow that one knows all those things at the aforementioned fourth dimension, just each of them has to be manifested by itself, so that consequently some of them may exist known, and some not.
At present the principle of those things that are prophetically manifested by the Divine light is the first truth, which the prophets do not run across in itself. Wherefore at that place is no need for their knowing all possible matters of prophecy; just each 1 knows some of them co-ordinate to the special revelation of this or that affair.
Respond to Objection 1: The Lord reveals to the prophets all things that are necessary for the didactics of the faithful; yet not all to every one, just some to one, and some to another.
Reply to Objection 2: Prophecy is by way of being something imperfect in the genus of Divine revelation: hence it is written (1 Cor. 13:eight) that "prophecies shall exist made void," and that "we prophesy in part," i.e. imperfectly. The Divine revelation will be brought to its perfection in heaven; wherefore the same text continues (1 Cor. 113:10): "When that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done abroad." Consequently it does not follow that naught is defective to prophetic revelation, merely that information technology lacks none of those things to which prophecy is directed.
Respond to Objection 3: He who has a science knows the principles of that scientific discipline, whence any is pertinent to that science depends; wherefore to have the habit of a science perfectly, is to know whatever is pertinent to that science. But God Who is the principle of prophetic knowledge is non known in Himself through prophecy; wherefore the comparison fails.
Whether the prophet always distinguishes what he says by his own spirit from what he says by the prophetic spirit?
Objection one: It would seem that the prophet always distinguishes what he says by his own spirit from what he says by the prophetic spirit. For Augustine states (Confess. vi, 13) that his mother said "she could, through a certain feeling, which in words she could not express, discern betwixt Divine revelations, and the dreams of her own soul." Now prophecy is a Divine revelation, equally stated above (A[3]). Therefore the prophet ever distinguishes what he says by the spirit of prophecy, from what he says by his own spirit.
Objection 2: Further, God commands nothing impossible, as Jerome [*Pelagius. Ep. 16, amid the supposititious works of St. Jerome] says. Now the prophets were commanded (Jer. 23:28): "The prophet that hath a dream, allow him tell a dream; and he that hath My word, let him speak My word with truth." Therefore the prophet can distinguish what he has through the spirit of prophecy from what he sees otherwise.
Objection iii: Further, the certitude resulting from a Divine light is greater than that which results from the light of natural reason. At present he that has science, by the light of natural reason knows for certain that he has information technology. Therefore he that has prophecy by a Divine light is much more sure that he has it.
On the reverse, Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.): "It must exist observed that sometimes the holy prophets, when consulted, utter sure things by their own spirit, through existence much accustomed to prophesying, and think they are speaking past the prophetic spirit."
I reply that, The prophet'south mind is instructed by God in 2 ways: in one way by an express revelation, in another way by a most mysterious instinct to "which the human listen is subjected without knowing it," as Augustine says (Gen. advert lit. 2, 17). Accordingly the prophet has the greatest certitude about those things which he knows by an express revelation, and he has it for certain that they are revealed to him by God; wherefore it is written (Jer. 26:fifteen): "In truth the Lord sent me to you, to speak all these words in your hearing." Else, were he non certain most this, the faith which relies on the utterances of the prophet would not be certain. A sign of the prophet'due south certitude may be gathered from the fact that Abraham being admonished in a prophetic vision, prepared to sacrifice his but-begotten son, which he nowise would have done had he not been nearly certain of the Divine revelation.
On the other mitt, his position with regard to the things he knows by instinct is sometimes such that he is unable to distinguish fully whether his thoughts are conceived of Divine instinct or of his ain spirit. And those things which we know by Divine instinct are not all manifested with prophetic certitude, for this instinct is something imperfect in the genus of prophecy. Information technology is thus that we are to empathize the saying of Gregory. Lest, however, this should lead to fault, "they are very shortly set up aright by the Holy Ghost [*For example, cf. 2 Kings 7:3 seqq.], and from Him they hear the truth, so that they reproach themselves for having said what was untrue," equally Gregory adds (Hom. i super Ezech.).
The arguments gear up downwards in the get-go place consider the revelation that is made by the prophetic spirit; wherefore the answer to all the objections is articulate.
Whether things known or declared prophetically tin be false?
Objection 1: It would seem that things known or declared prophetically tin be false. For prophecy is almost future contingencies, every bit stated above (A[three] ). Now future contingencies may possibly not happen; else they would happen of necessity. Therefore the thing of prophecy can exist simulated.
Objection ii: Farther, Isaias prophesied to Ezechias proverb (Is. 38:1): "Accept order with thy house, for g shalt surely dice, and shalt not live," and yet fifteen years were added to his life (four Kings 20:6). Once again the Lord said (Jer. 18:vii, eight): "I volition suddenly speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out and to pull down and to destroy it. If that nation confronting which I accept spoken shall repent of their evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do them." This is instanced in the example of the Ninevites, according to Jn. 3:x: "The Lord [Vulg.: 'God'] had mercy with regard to the evil which He had said that He would practise to them, and He did it not." Therefore the thing of prophecy tin can be false.
Objection 3: Further, in a conditional proposition, whenever the antecedent is absolutely necessary, the consequent is absolutely necessary, because the consequent of a provisional proffer stands in the same relation to the ancestor, equally the determination to the premises in a syllogism, and a syllogism whose bounds are necessary e'er leads to a necessary conclusion, as nosotros detect proved in I Poster. 6. But if the affair of a prophecy cannot be imitation, the following conditional proposition must needs be truthful: "If a thing has been prophesied, it will exist." At present the antecedent of this conditional proposition is absolutely necessary, since it is about the past. Therefore the consequent is likewise necessary absolutely; yet this is unfitting, for then prophecy would not be about contingencies. Therefore it is untrue that the affair of prophecy cannot be false.
On the contrary, Cassiodorus says [*Prol. in Psalt. i] that "prophecy is a Divine inspiration or revelation, announcing the issue of things with invariable truth." Now the truth of prophecy would not exist invariable, if its matter could be false. Therefore nothing false can come under prophecy.
I respond that, As may exist gathered from what has been said (AA[1],3,5), prophecy is a kind of knowledge impressed under the course of teaching on the prophet'southward intellect, past Divine revelation. Now the truth of knowledge is the same in disciple and teacher since the knowledge of the disciple is a likeness of the knowledge of the instructor, even equally in natural things the form of the affair generated is a likeness of the form of the generator. Jerome speaks in this sense when he says [*Comment. in Daniel ii, 10] that "prophecy is the seal of the Divine foreknowledge." Consequently the same truth must needs be in prophetic knowledge and utterances, as in the Divine knowledge, under which zip false tin possibly come up, equally stated in the FP, Q[16], A[8]. Therefore nil faux tin can come up under prophecy.
Reply to Objection ane: As stated in the FP, Q[14], A[thirteen] the certitude of the Divine foreknowledge does not exclude the contingency of future singular events, because that knowledge regards the time to come as present and already determinate to ane thing. Wherefore prophecy also, which is an "impressed likeness" or "seal of the Divine foreknowledge," does not by its unchangeable truth exclude the contingency of future things.
Reply to Objection 2: The Divine foreknowledge regards future things in two ways. Outset, every bit they are in themselves, in so far, to wit, equally it sees them in their presentiality: secondly, as in their causes, inasmuch as it sees the order of causes in relation to their effects. And though future contingencies, considered as in themselves, are determinate to one thing, yet, considered every bit in their causes, they are not so determined just that they can happen otherwise. Over again, though this twofold knowledge is always united in the Divine intellect, it is non always united in the prophetic revelation, because an imprint made by an agile cause is not always on a par with the virtue of that crusade. Hence sometimes the prophetic revelation is an imprinted likeness of the Divine foreknowledge, in so far as the latter regards future contingencies in themselves: and such things happen in the aforementioned way as foretold, for example this maxim of Is. 7:14: "Behold a virgin shall excogitate." Sometimes, withal, the prophetic revelation is an imprinted likeness of the Divine foreknowledge every bit knowing the club of causes to effects; and and then at times the event is otherwise than foretold. Notwithstanding the prophecy does not embrace a falsehood, for the pregnant of the prophecy is that inferior causes, whether they exist natural causes or human acts, are so disposed as to lead to such a effect. In this fashion we are to empathise the saying of Is. 38:one: "Thou shalt die, and not live"; in other words, "The disposition of thy body has a tendency to death": and the saying of Jonah three:4, "Nevertheless 40 days, and Nineveh shall exist destroyed," that is to say, "Its merits demand that it should be destroyed." God is said "to apologize," metaphorically, inasmuch every bit He bears Himself later on the manner of i who repents, by "irresolute His sentence, although He changes not His counsel" [*Cf. FP, Q[19], A[7], advertizement ii].
Reply to Objection iii: Since the same truth of prophecy is the aforementioned every bit the truth of Divine foreknowledge, as stated above, the conditional proposition: "If this was prophesied, it will be," is true in the same manner as the suggestion: "If this was foreknown, it volition be": for in both cases it is impossible for the antecedent non to be. Hence the consistent is necessary, considered, non as something future in our regard, but as being present to the Divine foreknowledge, as stated in the FP, Q[fourteen], A[thirteen], advertising 2.
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